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       Between November 1960 and May 1961, a subcommittee of the United States 
House of Representatives conducted an investigation into allegations of corruption 
within the US economic aid program in Peru. The Foreign Operations and Monetary 
Affairs Subcommittee (FOMAS) held nine hearings and questioned 23 witnesses, most 
of them officials from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Before its 
replacement by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in late 
1961, the ICA was the agency tasked with administering the USA’s international aid.  
       The members of the FOMAS were interested in three issues. First, accusations of 
conflict of interest against John R. Neale, head of the United States Operations Mission 
(USOM) and director of the Inter-American Cooperative Food Production Service 
(Servicio Cooperativo  Interamericano de Producción de Alimentos, SCIPA). Second, 
complaints about the alleged misuse of a US$2 million loan conceded to the Peruvian 
government to build a road in the Andes. Third, allegations involving the embezzlement 
of US$10 million in aid, intended for the victims of a drought in the Cusco area between 
1995 and 1956.  
       The main question that this paper explores is why the FOMAS invested 
considerable time and resources in investigating accusations of corruption that involved 
what might be regarded as a relatively small amount in aid. The sources consulted do 
not suggest it was for party-political reasons. Nor does it appear that the legislators 
were ideologically motivated, as they did not attack the economic aid in itself. But what 
the sources do indicate is a serious concern on the part of the Congress members with 
the administrative side of these allegations. The members of the FOMAS sought to 
understand how ICA had handled these allegations, and what they revealed about the 
efficiency of the aid program in Latin America.       
Barreto Velázquez, “Road That Goes to the Wrong Place” ii	
       The allegations of corruption within the aid program took on renewed importance 
when, on March 12, 1961, nine days before the start of the second round of hearings, 
President John F. Kennedy assembled a large group of Latin American diplomats to 
announce a new Latin American cooperation program, through which the USA aimed 
to combat inequality and poverty by promoting the economic development of its 
southern neighbors.    
The FOMAS members expressed concern about the ICA’s ability to efficiently 
and properly manage the multi-million-dollar investment that Kennedy´s proposal would 
entail, especially amid the accusations of corruption and mismanagement surrounding 
the US mission in Peru.  
       The FOMAS hearings also reflected the growing discomfort of the US Congress 
with the country’s economic aid program. By the early 1960s, there was little left of the 
bipartisan support that the aid program had attracted when it was founded, after the 
start of the Cold War. Frustration with a lack of palpable results and concerns over 
costs prompted increasing numbers of Congress members to question the efficiency of 
the program. The FOMAS investigation was part of this process. 
Because of time restrictions I will concentrate on on the accusations against 
Neale. 
The economic aid program  
       Before proceeding to analyze the FOMAS investigation, it is necessary to focus on 
the economic aid program scrutinized by the legislators to understand the context in 
which the investigation unfolded.  
       Congressional support of economic aid had its ups and downs. In the early postwar 
years, opposition to economic aid was led by conservative lawmakers who were 
concerned about costs.  The economic aid program survived thanks to the support of a 
bipartisan coalition made up of northern Democrats and moderate Republicans, united 
by the Cold War. According to the historians David Holm and Andrew David, this 
consensus began to break down in the run-up to the US involvement in the Vietnam 
War, with the program coming under attack in Congress during the early 1960s. For 
David and Holm stress the effect that the end of the Cold War consensus had on what 
Congress was prepared to do to oppose Communism. These authors contend that 
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Congress members lost their enthusiasm for the aid program because they did not 
understand its purpose -- that is, how it served US national interests. Moreover, they 
were conscious of the time and money required to complete aid projects. 
       For the economist Aurelius Morgner, the program had created certain expectations 
that it did not fulfill, especially in political terms. Congress, and the US population, hoped 
that the economic growth the program was supposed to deliver would translate into 
governments that were democratic, stable, and US-friendly. Accordingly, each coup 
d’etat or anti-US demonstration in an underdeveloped country was regarded as a failure 
of the program.  
       Whatever the reasons, it is clear that by the start of the 1960s, Congress had begun 
to question the efficiency and the merits of the economic aid program. The FOMAS 
investigation is proof of this. 
Accusations and administrative investigations 
       The main figure at this stage was a career official in the Department of State called 
John R. Neale. According to Department of State information, Neale was born in 1895, 
worked in the US government for 36 years, and was assigned to Peru from 1943 to 
1958. He became head of the aid mission in January 1952 and retired from public service 
in 1958. From the FOMAS hearings, we learn that he was married, had at least one 
daughter, and remained in Peru after retiring, where he took up livestock farming.  
       Neale was accused of having formed, alongside Peruvian businessman Juan Bazo, a 
company (Negociación Bazo Velarde Sociedad Anónima) engaged in livestock and 
industrial activities. As far as Neale’s detractors were concerned, this constituted a 
conflict of interest because, as head of USOM he could favor the company of which he 
was the main shareholder and chairman.  
 Neale was investigated on six occasions: in 1954, 1955, 1956, February 1958, 
April 1958, and 1959. The first three investigations were very lenient. The three 
investigators pointed out that Neale was a public official who was highly respected by 
his colleagues, and dismissed the accusations against him as a character assassination 
borne of problems with certain subordinates and, thus, were totally unfounded.  These 
investigations were subject to serious irregularities, with signs of cronyism and the 
exaggeration of Neale's credibility as mission leader.  
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       It was not until February 1958 that Neale was investigated with any thoroughness; 
this time, a letter sent by a Peruvian legislator to a US counterpart (Benton F. Jensen, R-
Iowa), and referred in turn to the ICA head (James H. Smith, Jr.), appears to have been 
decisive. This investigation confirmed the relationship between Neale and businessman 
Juan Bazo who, together with his wife Margaret, worked at the mission.  As we have 
seen, alongside Bazo, Neale had created a livestock enterprise, whose board he chaired. 
For the investigator Edward P. Guinane, this constituted a clear conflict of interest, since 
as head of the mission and director of the agricultural extension service (SCIPA), Neale 
could make decisions that might favor a company in which he held shares. Guinane 
therefore recommended his removal. The April 1958 investigation came to the same 
conclusion, and also recommended Neale’s dismissal. However, Neale was not 
dismissed, but was allowed to retire on a pension of $731 per month.  
The FOMAS hearings 
Before we continue examining the course of the FOMAS investigation, it is worth 
noting that it almost provoked a constitutional collision with two presidential 
administrations. The first hearing was held on November 14, 1960, less than a week 
after the Republican defeat in the presidential election that year. The outgoing 
Republican administration did not cooperate with the FOMAS, refusing to submit the 
documentation that the body had requested, to the frustration of the subcommittee 
members. 
       This situation did not improve after John F. Kennedy was sworn in as president in 
January 1961. The new administration also refused to hand over the requested 
documentation to the Department of State. Moreover, on the instructions of the newly 
appointed secretary of state, Dean Rusk, a group of witnesses declined to answer 
questions related to the Neale case. This sparked a backlash by committee members 
that leaked out to the printed press. But the dispute was resolved relatively swiftly when 
the Kennedy administration submitted the documentation and allowed ICA and 
Department of State officials to answer the subcommittee’s questions.  
       Why did two presidential administrations –one Republican and the other 
Democrat– attempt to block the FOMAS investigation?  The documentation examined 
does not provide a conclusive answer to this question.  We can only speculate that it 
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was for institutional rather than political reasons. It would appear, especially in the case 
of the Eisenhower administration, that the defense of institutionalism prevailed against 
what the executive officials saw as undue legislative interference. In the case of the 
Kennedy administration, the immediate context must also have been an important factor 
since the hearings coincided with the launch, in March 1961, of the Alliance for Progress 
(AP). That is, perhaps there was a desire to avoid a scandal that would affect the 
proposed program of economic aid for Latin America.  
       Throughout the hearings members of FOMAS stressed one basic question that 
prompted others: how had the ICA handled the complaints against Neale?  Their 
conclusion was clear: its handling was terrible and reflected serious failings in the aid 
program, sparking fears among subcommittee members about possible mismanagement 
of the economic aid that the Kennedy administration wanted to give Latin America under 
the terms of the AP, and which required the approval of Congress.  
       For the FOMAS members, it was evident that the ICA had been ineffective in its 
handling of the accusations against Neale. It had investigated these accusations in 1954, 
1955 and 1956 without conclusively determining that they were unfounded. Those 
behind the accusations were mistreated or even dismissed, Neale's explanations were 
accepted uncritically, and when it was finally established that the head of mission had 
engaged in a clear conflict of interest, he was allowed to retire. Moreover, no criminal 
charges were brought against him in the courts of justice. For the members of the 
subcommittee, it was obvious that the ICA officials were more concerned about 
concealing the scandal, as well as protecting their friend, than they were about 
discharging their responsibilities. 
        The FOMAS criticisms were centered on two officials: Theodor C. Achilles 
(Assistant to the Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Peru) y Rollin S. Atwood 
(head of the Office of Special Operations, Inter-American Development Bank; and 
formerly regional director, Office of Latin American Operations, ICA).  
       Achilles, a member of the Foreign Service from 1931, had been the US ambassador 
in Peru from July 1956 to January 1960; in this role he was responsible for the embassy’s 
officials, Neale among them. Achilles came in for harsh criticism because of how he had 
handled the accusations against the head of mission, having only gone as far as to 
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acknowledge Neale's involvement in an unintentional “technical conflict of interest”. For 
Achilles, Neale did not act in bad faith in his dealings with Bazo, and nor did he seek to 
benefit financially.   
         Achilles was also criticized for having failed to confirm or investigate the 
accusations against Neale, and for having trusted the explanations he had ventured 
without subjecting them to scrutiny.  Achilles subscribed to the theory put forward by 
several witnesses: that Neale had fallen prey to the ill-will of some of his subordinates. 
All this was roundly condemned by the subcommittee members, who saw Achilles's 
attitude as proof of the shortfalls of the economic aid program.   
  Atwood began working in the Department of State in 1942. In 1955 he was 
assigned to the ICA as director of the Office of Latin American Operations, a post he 
occupied until 1961. Atwood was Neale’s immediate superior and thus the individual 
responsible for his supervision. 
       Atwood came in for two fundamental criticisms: first, with regard to his view that 
the aid program was beyond the accusations against Neale; and second, that his attitude 
toward the accusations and investigations were conditioned by his friendship with the 
head of mission. The subcommittee members were highly critical of Atwood, who they 
felt had been inefficient, irresponsible, and passive in discharging his duties. 
       Atwood stated that he met with one of Neale’s accusers, a Mr. Tarr, and then 
conversed with Neale, who refuted Tarr’s claims. The refutations of the head of mission 
and the rumors about Tarr that Atwood had heard, from US and Peruvian citizens alike, 
prompted the ambassador to petition Neale for his dismissal – and Neale obliged. To 
Hardy’s questioning, Atwood said that he sought Tarr’s resignation due to 
insubordination, and not because he had accused Neale. 
 
       The FOMAS members’ criticisms of Tarr's dismissal were overwhelming. Atwood 
was asked why he had dismissed the allegations against Tarr without examining their 
validity, especially when the most significant of them (the conflict of interest) proved to 
be true. Atwood answered that although there was no excuse for the conflict of interest, 
he had known Neale for more than 20 years, had great confidence in him.  
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       This did not convince the members of the subcommittee, who questioned 
Atwood’s capabilities as an administrator. At the time of his testimony, Atwood was 
head of the Office of Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
as such was responsible for a budget of $394 million. This worried the lawmakers, 
especially after having evidenced Atwood's passivity and inefficiency in handling the Neal 
case. In the words of Hardy, 
The harsh words of Hardy revealed the primary motive behind these hearings: 
concerns about the administration of the aid program and the possible cost of its 
inefficiency for the US people. These concerns were shared by an increasing number of 
Congress members, and foreshadowed problems for the US aid program. 
Conclusion 
        The FOMAS investigation was part of the process of congressional scrutiny and 
questioning of US foreign aid, which, as we have made clear, intensified during the 1960s. 
The subcommittee members were concerned about the handling of economic aid, paid 
for by US taxpayers. Hence their interest in the Neale case, which evidenced the 
problems of lack of oversight and scrutiny of aid by the officials tasked with administering 
it: the ICA. 
       These concerns intensified in the face of the imminent launch of a new economic 
aid program for Latin America, which would entail a multi-million-dollar investment by 
the US government. In the words of two important members of the FOMAS, 
What concerned the subcommittee members was the millions of dollars assigned 
to Latin America as part of the implementation of Alliance for Progress. The FOMAS 
investigation had exposed the ICA's inability to investigate and remedy the problems 
reported in Peru in a timely manner. Worried, the members asked themselves whether 
the AP funds would be used properly and efficiently.  
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